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A monstrous black silhouette set against the wilderness of
the North Shore of Lake Superior, the Reserve Mining Com-
pany's taconite "beneficiating" plant stands as a grim reminder
of man's ability to destroy natural beauty. Its smokestacks inter-
minably belching white clouds as it daily emits 67,000 tons of
taconite waste into the blue waters of the lake, the plant repre-
sents, in the words of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
"a monumental environmental mistake."' It also represents, how-
ever, the major source of employment, commercial prosperity,
and tax revenue for several North Shore communities, as well
as the primary source of iron ore for Reserve's parent companies,
Armco and Republic Steel.2 The efforts of environmentalists to
halt or modify Reserve's operation have thus met with both a
valiant defense by the company and its dependents, and a con-
siderable amount of judicial sympathy.
Since 1969, when official pollution enforcement activities be-
gan, the contest between Reserve and its opponents has surfaced
1. Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1085 (8th
Cir. 1974). Reserve mines low grade iron ore (taconite) on the Mesabi
Iron Range in northern Minnesota and transports the raw ore to its "ben-
eficiating" plant on the shore of Lake Superior at Silver Bay. There
it extracts iron from the taconite by a process of grinding, crushing, and
magnetic separation. The waste product, taconite "tailings" ranging in
size from pebbles to microscopic particles, are flushed into Lake Superior
with water drawn from the lake.
The operation began in 1955 and achieved its present magnitude in
1960. The tailings discharge was originally sanctioned by state and fed-
eral permits, which were granted after hearings on the obvious pollution
questions had satisfied the agencies concerned that the discharge would
create its own "high density current" that would carry the tailings di-
rectly to the bottom of the lake, to settle there forever. The comment
of the court of appeals that the decision to allow Reserve to discharge
its tailings into the lake had been an "environmental mistake" was based
upon a district court finding that the tailings do not in fact all sink to
the lake bottom, but disperse via currents over a considerable portion
of the lake's western arm. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F.
Supp. 11, 36-39 (D. Minn. 1974).
2. The plant supplies about 12 percent of the iron ore produced
in the United States. Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 514 F.2d 492, 536 (8th Cir. 1975).
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in almost every -available state and federal judicial or adminis-
trative forum.3 Only recently, with the final decision of the
3. Pollution enforcement proceedings against Reserve began in
May of 1969, when the Secretary of the Interior, pursuant to his authority
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1160(d)
(1970) (FWPCA), convened a Lake Superior Enforcement Conference to
consider the interstate pollution of Lake Superior. (The FWPCA is now
administered by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, and the conference procedure has been replaced by the more
streamlined enforcement procedures of the 1972 amendments. Id. § 1251
et seq. (Supp. II 1972). Reserve was the second and last case tried under
the old FWPCA.) The governments of the United States, Minnesota,
Michigan, and Wisconsin were represented at the Conference. In Sep-
tember of 1969 the Conference concluded that Reserve's tailings dis-
charge into the lake constituted pollution of interstate waters subject to
abatement under the FWPCA, id. § 1160(g) (1970), and requested Re-
serve to come forward with a plan to modify the discharge. At that
time the only pollution in question was that of the lake itself; the as-
bestos-related public health issue that has dominated the case recently
had not yet been raised.
Meanwhile, just prior to the Conference, Minnesota's Pollution Con-
trol Agency (MPCA) had adopted certain water quality standards ap-
plicable to Lake Superior and to Reserve's discharges. This action was
prompted by the FWPCA provision that unless a state established stand-
ards meeting the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary
would designate standards for the state. Id. § 1160 (c). The Secretary
approved Minnesota's standards in November 1969, and Reserve appealed
their adoption to the Minnesota District Court for Lake County, claiming
that the standards were invalid or inapplicable to its operation. The
state counterclaimed, alleging violation of the standards and seeking to
enjoin Reserve from polluting the lake in violation of a Minnesota statu-
tory definition of that pollution, MINN. STAT. § 115.01(5) (1969). After
a seven week trial, the court concluded that Reserve was not pollut-
ing the lake, and that the water quality standards in question were
either inapplicable or arbitrary and capricious as applied to Reserve.
Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 2 E.R.C. 1135,
1141 (Dist. Ct., Lake County, Minn. 1970). The court did find, however,
that Reserve's discharge might possibly be a source of lake pollution in
the future, and thus ordered the parties to agree upon a plan to modify
the discharge. Id. at 1144-45. (The court apparently had in mind "floc-
culating," or congealing, the tailings to ensure their descent to the lake
bottom.) The MPCA appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court, alleging
that Reserve had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, but the
court held in Reserve's favor. Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota Pollu-
tion Control Agency, 294 Minn. 300, 200 N.W.2d 142 (1972).
In January of 1971, immediately following the Lake County trial,
Reserve submitted to the Lake Superior Enforcement Conference a plan
for flocculating its tailings. The Conference rejected the plan, notified
Reserve pursuant to the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c) (5) (1970), that it
was in violation of the Federal-State Water Quality Standards adopted
by the MPCA and approved by the Secretary, and requested the United
States Attorney General to bring suit against Reserve. See id. § 1160(g).
Thus, in early 1972 the United States filed suit against Reserve in the
Federal District Court for the District of Minnesota, and was soon joined
by the states of Michigan and Wisconsin and a number of environmental
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Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,4 and an almost certainly
final denial of relief by the United States Supreme Court,5 does
a resolution of the matter appear to be in sight; the precise con-
organizations as plaintiff-intervenors. Several North Shore municipalities
and civic organizations intervened in Reserve's behalf. The court agreed
to join Minnesota as a plaintiff on Reserve's motion, and eventually Re-
serve's parent companies, Armco and Republic Steel, were joined as de-
fendants, though not without a battle. See Armco Steel Corp. v. United
States, 490 F.2d 688 (8th Cir. 1974).
In June of 1973, just prior to the commencement of trial, the plain-
tiffs announced their discovery that Reserve's tailings discharge and air
emissions contain substantial quantities of carcinogenic asbestos fibers,
and that these fibers are found in dangerous quantities in the drinking
water of Duluth and other North Shore communities and in the air of
Silver Bay. Since that time the primary focus of the case has been this
"health issue," although the "pollution issues" (lake and air) were inci-
dentally litigated.
The trial began on August 1, 1973, and proceeded until April 20, 1974,
when the district court enjoined the operation of the plant, effective im-
mediately, on the ground that its discharges were "endangering" the pub-
lic health in violation of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1160(g) (1), (2) (1970),
and various other state and federal laws. United States v. Reserve Min-
ing Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 54-58 (D. Minn. 1974). Reserve appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which granted a temporary stay
two days later, and then, on June 4, a 70-day stay pending appeal. Re-
serve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1074-75 (8th Cir. 1974).
The basis for the stay was that Reserve had demonstrated a strong like-
lihood that it would succeed on the merits of its appeal on the health
issue. Id. at 1076, 1084. The court also held, however, that the plaintiffs
were likely to succeed on the pollution issues-which the district court
had also determined adversely to Reserve-and thus conditioned its stay
upon Reserve's coming forth with a good faith plan to curtail its air emis-
sions and to dispose of its tailings on land. Id. at 1084-85. Minnesota
unsuccessfully appealed to the United States Supreme Court to vacate
the stay. Minnesota v. Reserve Mining Co., 94 S. Ct. 3203 (1974).
Later that summer, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ex-
tended the stay indefinitely until its decision on the merits, on the ground
that the parties had made "significant progress" in reaching agreements
as to an on-land disposal site. Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, No.
1291 (8th Cir., Aug. 28, 1974). (The court did not mention control of the
air emissions. Apparently it considered them a less serious source of
pollution.) Minnesota, now joined by the United States, again appealed
to the United States Supreme Court to vacate the stay, and the Court
over dissent again declined to do so. Minnesota v. Reserve Mining Co.,
95 S. Ct. 287 (1974). The appeal on the merits was eventually heard
by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in December of 1974; the
final decision in that appeal was rendered in March of the next year,
Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492
(8th Cir. 1975), and a final and unsuccessful petition for relief was taken
to the Supreme Court. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 95 S. Ct.
1441 (1975). It is the final decision of the court of appeals that is the
focus of this Note.
4. Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514
F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
5. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 95 S. Ct. 1441 (1975).
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tours of the resolution, however, remain unclear. The essence
of the final ruling by the court of appeals is that Reserve's air
emissions and tailings discharge contain asbestiform fibers poten-
tially injurious to the health of North Shore residents.0 Thus,
the company must take prompt steps to curtail its air emissions,
and must construct and convert to an "on-land" disposal system
for its tailings as soon as it and the state can agree upon a site.
If a site is not agreed upon withirn approximately one year, the
plant must close; but even then, Reserve may continue operations
one more year in order to allow its parent corporations time to
find an alternate source of ore.7
The remarkable aspects of this final ruling are that it essen-
tially reverses the same court's earlier decision in the case, which
had granted Reserve a stay of a district court injunction on the
ground that a health threat had not been proved, and that it
reaches the new result by gratuitously applying the liberal stand-
ard of proof that the stay opinion had chastised the district court
for applying." In its stay opinion the appellate court had criti-
cized the district court for going "one step beyond the evidence"
in finding an enjoinable health threat.9 Nonetheless, it had
agreed with the lower court that Reserve's discharges were pol-
luting the air and water, and so had conditioned the stay upon
Reserve's preparing to abate the discharges. 0 Thus, in its final
opinion the appellate court could easily have granted the relief
it did simply by affirming the tentative holdings of its stay opin-
ion. Instead, declining even to reach the pollution issues," the
court adopted the more lenient standard of proof that the district
6. 514 F.2d at 500.
7. Id. at 538-39. The court intentionally did not set specific time
limits for completion of either Reserve's "on-land" move or its air emis-
sions curtailment. The former must begin within about a year; the latter
immediately. Id. Since the opinion, Reserve has begun to install an
air filtration system, which it is estimated will be complete in one to
two years. A move to on-land disposal will probably take at least three
years to complete after a site is finally agreed upon.
8. In order to sustain his burden of proof or persuasion as to an
alleged fact, a party bearing that burden must establish the existence
of that fact with a particular degree of certainty in the mind of the trier
of fact. The "standard of proof," then, is a measure of the degree of
certainty which will be required. (To be distinguished, of course, is the
allocation of the burden, i.e., the determination of which party bears the
risk of nonpersuasion.)
9. Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1084 (8th
Cir. 1974).
10. Id. See also note 3 supra.
11. Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514
F.2d 492, 500 n.19 (8th Cir. 1975).
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court had applied and enjoined the discharges, though not im-
mediately, as threats to public health.12 This about-face is the
more interesting for the fact that during the interim between
the two appellate court opinions a law review article1 3 and two
Congressional bills concerning the burden of proof in environ-
mental litigation 1 4 had taken issue with the standard of proof
applied in the stay opinion and had proposed the approach
adopted in the final decision.
The court did not explicitly acknowledge that it was re-
versing itself. Instead, it explained that different standards of
proof should apply to the same facts depending on whether
the issue is the propriety of an immediate injunction, as it was
in the stay opinion, or the propriety of delayed relief, as in the
final decision.15 This distinction, however, is untenable both in
theory and in light of the language of the two opinions,' 6 and
is best viewed as a face-saving artifice which will not be repeated.
Whether the real reason for the court's change of position on the
health issue was the adverse criticism that greeted its stay opin-
ion or simply a more thorough review of the voluminous evidence
in the months that followed that rather hastily issued opinion"
can only be surmised.
The broader significance of the appellate court's adoption of
this more lenient standard of proof, which may best be termed
the "risk-benefit" approach, is that it represents a novel judicial
implementation of that standard in an environmental suit not
involving the review of administrative agency action.'" For sev-
eral years environmentalists have argued that traditional rules
of proof are a major impediment to protecting man and his en-
12. Id. at 538-40.
13. Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environ-
mental Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAIF. L. Ray. 371, 380-81 (1975). See notes
19-22 infra and accompanying text.
14. S. 841, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 776, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975). These bills are discussed in text accompanying notes 136-47
infra.
15. 514 F.2d at 507.
16. See text accompanying notes 92-96 infra.
17. See note 3 supra.
18. Several cases have upheld the use of risk-benefit principles by
administrative agencies formulating regulations in areas where the types
of harm the agency is authorized to prevent are difficult to prove by
ordinary judicial standards. See, e.g., South Terminal Corp. v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 504 F.2d 646, 655 n.6 (1st Cir. 1974); Amoco
Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 501 F.2d 722, 740-41 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467,
474 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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vironment from the "future adverse impact" of pollution.19 The
problem, as they see it, is that the traditional rules fail to give
proper weight to mere risks of harm-that is, to possible future
harms that can be proved under ordinary standards only with
great difficulty, but which are nonetheless serious enough to
warrant preventive judicial intervention. Thus they have urged
the courts not to rigidly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that
the occurrence of harm is "more probable than not"---or what-
ever the prevailing standard prescribes 20 -but rather to consider
a variety of factors in determining the propriety of relief. The
key factors suggested are the gravity of the harm should it occur,
the degree of certainty that it will occur, and the benefits of
allowing the allegedly harmful activity to occur. The theory is
that if the risks of harm (the first two factors considered to-
gether) outweigh the benefits of the activity, relief should be
granted whether or not the ordinary standard of proof 2' has been
met. Thus, the greater the gravity or the smaller the benefits,
the less certain need be the harm.22
19. Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 13, at 412. See also note 22 infra.
20. The normal formulation of the standard of proof required in
civil cases is a "preponderance of evidence." McCoRMIcK's HANDBOOK
or Tm LAW or EviDENcE § 339 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972); 9 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2498 (3d ed. 1940). This phrase is potentially misleading,
in that it implies that the matter to be measured is the evidence itself,
whereas in fact the question is what degree of certainty the evidence
must produce in the mind of the trier of fact. Therefore this Note will
employ the synonymous phrases "more likely than not" and "more prob-
able than not."
Some state courts have applied a standard of proof stricter than the
"more probable than not" test in common-law nuisance suits to enjoin
anticipated harm, e.g., Green v. Castle Concrete Co., 181 Colo. 309, 509
P.2d 588 (1973). See generally Note, Imminent Irreparable Injury: A
Need for Reform, 45 S. CAur. L. Ixv., 1025, 1027 (1972). Several federal
cases also contain language suggesting that a stricter standard of proof
is appropriate in suits for injunctions, but upon closer examination they
reveal that the ordinary "more probable than not" standard was in fact
applied. For example, in Caribbean Atlantic Airlines, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists, 283 F. Supp. 601, 605 (D. Puerto Rico 1968),
the court stated that the "plaintiff must present facts sufficient to show
a necessity for and a clear right to such relief," but rejected plaintiff's
proof of injury because it was not established by "a preponderance of
the evidence" (emphasis added). See also Detroit News. Pub. Ass'n v.
Typographical Union Local 18, 471 F.2d 872 (6th Cir. 1972) (harm-loss
of wages-mu.t be clearly shown to be irreparable, but no indication
of a higher than ordinary standard of proof).
21. See note 20 supra.
22. The leading attack on traditional rules of proof is Krier, Envi-
vironmental Litigation and the Burden of Proof, in LAW AND THE ENvr-
RONMENT 105 (J. Page & M. Baldwin eds. 1970). The author starts from
the premise that because "resource consumers . . . can continue their
[Vol. 59:893
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The final decision of the appellate court in Reserve is ap-
parently a faithful implementation of this approach. Despite
that appearance, however, the court's interpretation of the risk-
benefit theory reflects two essential misconceptions which led
conduct until sued," and resource preservers will therefore usually be
plaintiffs charged with the burden of proof, our legal system is biased in
favor of resource consumption. Id. at 107. He then points out that
"judges traditionally have felt least restrained about law-making activ-
ity when they could operate through the medium of burden of proof," id.
at 108, and suggests that, in suits to prevent environmental harm, once a
plaintiff has made "a reasonable showing... that a proposed course of
action poses a probable threat of significant environmental damage,"judges should ease the plaintiff's burden by shifting to the defendant the
burden of coming forward with evidence on the likelihood of harm from
his activity and the feasibility of alternatives, id. at 115. Professor Krier
cites Professor Joseph Sax's proposed Environmental Protection Act,
then pending before the Michigan legislature, as incorporating this view.
Id. Professor Sax's proposal has now become law in several states, in-
cluding Minnesota. MNN. STAT. § 116B.01 et seq. (1974).
Professor Krier's article was followed by a law review note ad-
dressed to the more limited problem posed by the rule of some statejurisdictions that injunctions of threatened or anticipated nuisances must
rest on proof that the harm is "practically certain" to occur in the im-
mediate future. Note, supra note 20, at 1027. The author suggested
that courts determine the weight to be accorded anticipated harm by
reference to several factors:
the (1) probability of occurrence of the harm, (2) magnitude
and nature of the harm, (3) burden on the defendant and society
if the injunction is granted, (4) necessary margin-of-safety, and(5) availability of alternatives to the defendant's proposed ac-
tions.
Id. at 1061. The third and fifth of these factors seem to be encompassed
by the concept of the "benefits" in allowing a defendant's activity to con-
tinue, and the fourth could be considered an element of the first. Thus
in the present consideration of the risk-benefit approach to the standard
of proof, all of these factors are included.
The most recent article on the subject is Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note
13. The author's proposal is a more sophisticated version of the one pre-
sented in the Note just discussed:
Legislatures have sufficient discretion to base prohibitions on
risks rather than proof of injury even if they do so relatively
rarely. First, concepts of harm and injury must be redefined
to include the risk of future adverse impact. Second, the factors
relevant to a cost-benefit analysis must be defined to include
risks of uncertain harm as a cost, and courts and agencies mustbe given the discretion to undertake a risk-benefit analysis as
a justification for preventing or limiting an activity which poses
only a risk of future adverse impact. Third, the burden of risk
identification must in some instances be shifted to those whose
activities threaten ecosystem stability.
Id. at 412. The article, published after the stay opinion but before the
final decision by the appellate court in Reserve, specifically criticizes that
court for its failure to apply a risk-benefit analysis in the former opinion.
Id. at 380-81. The court, in its final opinion, cites the article approv-
ingly-though not the pages criticizing the stay opinion. 514 F.2d at 536.
The risk-benefit approach, it will be noted, is analogous to the well-
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the court to improperly delay relief. First, having concluded
that abatement of the discharges was warranted by the health
threat, the court refused to grant an immediate injunction on
the ground that the "probabilities" of harm were low. 23 Second,
in distinguishing the "potential" health threat that it found in
Reserve from the "imminent" danger that it thought would jus-
tify immediate relief,24 the court failed to realize that the threat
from Reserve's discharges is indeed "imminent." Unless these
errors are recognized, the effectiveness of the risk-benefit ap-
proach may be greatly diminished, as it was in Reserve, by judi-
cial failure to appreciate the need for prompt relief from public
health threats.
This Note will attempt to prevent such a result by explaining
the court's two misconceptions. In the process it will contrast
the court's two Reserve opinions in order to illustrate the radi-
cally different results that may be reached on the same set of
facts by applying, alternatively, the risk-benefit approach and
a more conservative standard of proof. Finally, the Note will
question whether the proposed statutory implementation of the
risk-benefit approach in environmental litigation is desirable,
and, if so, whether it can be so formulated as to preclude the
problems posed by the court's interpretation of that approach.25
known formula of Judge Learned Hand for determining whether the
course of action followed by a tort defendant was reasonable:
[T]he owner's duty, as in similar situations ... is a function
of three variables: (1) The probability [of the event's occur-
rence]; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury . . . ; (3) the
burden of adequate precautions.
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
As the tort defendant is thought to have acted unreasonably if (3) out-
weighs (1) x (2), so a court could be said to act unreasonably in fail-
ing to enjoin possible harm where the risks outweigh the benefits.
23. 514 F.2d at 536.
24. Id. at 500, 528, 537. Some federal environmental statutes allow
the immediate injunction of pollution posing an "imminent" danger to
public health. The court distinguished the potential health threat in Re-
serve from such imminent dangers. See text accompanying notes 109-
35 infra.
25. This Note will refer generally to the risk-benefit approach to
the standard of proof in environmental litigation. For certain purposes,
however, one must draw a distinction between suits involving an alleged
threat to public health and those which are concerned only with the pol-
lution of our natural environment. Theoretically, risk-benefit principles
are equally applicable to both types of suit, and indeed the commenta-
tors, see note 22 supra, have not distinguished between them in proffer-
ing that approach to the standard of proof. The judiciary, however, will
undoubtedly be more inclined to take account of mere risks of harm
where the public health is at issue. Thus, the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to apply risk-benefit principles to the
[Vol. 59:893
RESERVE MINING
I. FROM LEGISLATIVE POLICY JUDGMENT TO
RISK-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
A rudimentary understanding of the factual issues raised by
the health threat charges is essential to an appreciation of the
significance of the appellate court's treatment of the standard
of proof. The inhalation of asbestos fibers under certain circum-
stances is known to be extremely dangerous to man. A high
incidence of deaths from cancer and asbestosis is consistently
found among people who have worked in or lived near asbestos
manufacturing plants, and even those who have merely lived
in the homes of asbestos workers and been exposed to fibers
brought home in the workers' clothing have died from the ex-
posure.26 The period of inhalation need not be very lengthy;
health issue does not necessarily mean that the court would apply the
same approach where only environmental pollution was at stake, al-
though it is certainly good precedent for such an application.
On the other hand, the standard of proof has ceased to be a matter
of much consequence in many suits involving ordinary environmental
pollution, because specific statutory effluent limitations, air and water
quality standards, and the like now define such pollution with precision.
See, e.g., the enforcement provisions of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1857c-8(b) (1970), and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1319(b) (Supp. II 1972). A consideration of benefits will, of
course, continue to be relevant to a determination of the "appropriate
relief" to which those sections refer, but such a consideration has been
generally applied in equity for decades. 7 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTICE
65.18[3] nn.23-24 (2d ed. 1974).
Statutory definitions of pollution enjoinable as a threat to public
health, however, continue to be couched in such general descriptive terms
as "endangering" the public health, see note 24 supra and accompanying
text, thus giving the courts much leeway in determining whether a viola-
tion has occurred. The bills inspired by the Reserve case, see text ac-
companying notes 109-35 infra, are simply attempts to ensure that the
courts will apply risk-benefit principles in interpreting those definitions.
The focus of this Note, then, will be upon the application of risk-benefit
principles to the standard of proof in suits involving an alleged threat
to public health; but the principles discussed are equally applicable to
suits involving only pollution of air, land, or water.
26. Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514
F.2d 492, 507-08 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380
F. Supp. 11, 40-41 (D. Minn. 1974). A dramatic illustration of the dan-
gers of asbestos exposure is contained in the following passage from the
New York Times:
In the last three months, three persons who were children
at the time their relatives worked in the Paterson plant were
found to have mesothelioma.
One of the three died of the disease in June at the age of
44. Her father had worked the late shift at the UNARCO plant
for a year in the mid-1940's, and she took him a hot meal every
evening, waiting outside the plant for her father to pick it up.
Another patient was indirectly exposed to asbestos for just six
months when she was four years old, and in the third case, the
1975]
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deaths have been traced to exposures of only a few weeks or
months.2 7 Despite the recorded cases, however, science has not
yet been able to -ascertain the dose-response relationship between
exposure and disease, or the threshold level (if any) of exposure
below which there is no danger of disease.28  Further compli-
cating any attempt to predict accurately the effect of particular
asbestos exposures are the facts that the tiny fibers are ex-
tremely difficult to count -and that the symptoms of asbestos-
induced -diseases do not become manifest until at least 20 years
after initial exposure.29
In the Reserve case, the plaintiffs' health hazard claim was
based on an assertion that the ore mined by the company con-
tains "an asbestiform variety of the amphibole mineral cumming-
tonite-grunerite, 30 and that the processing of the ore results in
the discharge into air and water of mineral fibers substantially
identical or identical to the fibers discharged by asbestos manu-
facturing plants. Plaintiffs contended that these fibers are pres-
ent in dangerous quantities in the air of Silver Bay, Minnesota,
where the plant is located, and in the drinking water of Duluth
and other North Shore communities down current from Reserve.
Reserve denied that the fibers in its discharges are identical to
asbestos, that they reach municipal drinking supplies, that their
ingestion can cause disease, and, even assuming the foregoing,
that the fibers present in the air and water are sufficiently nu-
merous to be a health problem. The federal district court, after
a nine month trial, determined all these issues adversely to Re-
serve and closed the plant on the ground that it endangers the
public health.31
patient's father had worked at the plant for a year. This pa-
tient's sister, a nonsmoker, died of lung cancer at the age of 39.
A fourth person, the daughter of the man who developed
the asbestos material made by UNARCO, died in 1965 of
mesothelioma, the same disease that took her father's life 14
years earlier.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1974, at 27, col. 1.
The cancers primarily involved are those of the lung, gastro-
intestinal tract, and pleura. The latter cancer is called mesothelioma.
Asbestosis, a respiratory disease, is a diffuse scarring of the lung result-
ing from the inhalation of asbestos dust. Reserve Mining Co. v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492, 507 (8th Cir. 1975).
27. Id. at 508.
28. Id. The dose-response relationship "quantifies the association
between disease-producing levels of exposure and the incidence of
disease."
29. Id.
30. Id. at 501.
31. 380 F. Supp. at 11.
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A. THE STAY OPINION
The appellate court, in ruling on Reserve's motion for a stay
of the injunction pending an appeal on the merits-and thus on
whether Reserve had made a strong showing that it was likely
to succeed on the merits3 -- held that, inasmuch as "any ill effects
are simply beyond proof," the evidence did not support the dis-
trict court's finding of a "demonstrable hazard" to the public
health.33 rn its view, the district court had violated judicial
"rules of proof"34 and rendered an impermissible "legislative
policy judgment" in determining to resolve "all uncertainties...
in favor of health safety."35
A brief summary of the stay opinion will illustrate exactly
how the evidence had failed to establish a health hazard under
the appellate court's "rules of proof." That court had tacitly
adopted the findings of the trial court that Reserve's discharges
did contain fibers identical to commercial asbestos and that the
fibers were present in the air of Silver Bay and various munic-
ipal water supplies. Thus it considered only whether the cir-
cumstances of exposure constituted a health hazard. Because
Reserve had been in operation for less than 20 years, direct proof
of harm was of course impossible. Therefore, the court deter-
32. The court acknowledged the standard formulation of the appel-
lant's burden on a motion for stay of an injunction pending appeal: he
must make
(1) a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits
of the appeal; (2) a showing that, unless a stay is granted, he
will suffer irreparable injury; (3) a showing that no substantial
harm will come to other interested parties; and (4) a showing
that a stay will do no harm to the public interest.
498 F.2d at 1076-77. See also Long v. Robinson, 432 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir.
1970). It concluded, however, that because of the "enormous economic
impact" that closing the plant would have upon Reserve, its employees,
and their communities, "our preliminary resolution of the health hazard
question should control our action as to whether to grant or deny a stay."
498 F.2d at 1077. Thus the court addressed itself primarily to Reserve's
likelihood of success on the health issue, although it also found that the
plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the pollution issue and thus condi-
tioned the stay on Reserve's presentation of plans to end its air and water
pollution. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
33. 498 F.2d at 1083. The phrase "demonstrable hazard," or varia-
tions of it, appears frequently in the opinion. See id. at 1077, 1083, 1084.
The court apparently treated this phrase as synonymous with the phrase
"endangering" the public health contained in the relevant FWPCA provi-
sion, 33 U.S.C. § 1160(g) (1970), see note 24 supra, for it cited the district
court's reluctance to assert the existence of a "health danger" as tacit
support for its own conclusion that a "health hazard" had not been
proved. 498 F.2d at 1083.
34. Id. at 1084.
35. Id.
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mined that in order to prove their case plaintiffs would have
to establish either that the fibers were present in quantities com-
parable to those present in the occupational setting of asbestos
manufacturing plants, or that, though present in lesser quanti-
ties, those lesser quantities could be measured "with some pre-
cision" and shown to exceed a "known" threshold level.", This
formulation was biased in favor of Reserve. It ignored the fact
that exposures less severe than those associated with occupa-
tional situations have proved fatal,37 and it demanded "precision"
of measurement and a "known" threshold level where neither
could be provided.
Applying these requirements to the evidence, the court of
appeals concluded that air counts at Silver Bay were far below
occupational levels. It reached this result by comparing the fiber
counts taken in that community by a court-appointed witness
to the maximum levels permitted in asbestos factories under Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) regulations, which
it assumed to represent the occupational norm.38 As to whether
some lower level of airborne fibers could be found with "some
precision" to exceed a known threshold level, the court pointed
out that all of the fiber counts, being subject to at least a nine-
fold margin of error, were too imprecise to be "quantifiable,"
and that the threshold level was at any rate unknown.3 9 The
36. Id. at 1078-79.
37. See note 26 supra and accompanying text, discussing the evi-
dence linking deaths to both occupational and "environmental" expo-
sures.
38. 498 F.2d at 1078. Even assuming the propriety of the court's
refusal to recognize the known dangers of environmental exposures, the
significance of this comparison is suspect. The air counts chosen-those
of the court-appointed witness, Dr. Taylor-were the lowest of the many
counts considered by the trial court. Moreover, the trial court had re-jected the Taylor counts as "biased" because taken in large part on rainy
days, when fiber concentrations would naturally be low. 380 F. Supp. at
49. Indeed, Dr. Taylor himself recognized this bias. Brief for Plaintiff-
Appellee-Appellant United States at 33, Reserve Mining Co. v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (citing the trial
transcript). Moreover, the OSHA standard with which the court com-
pared North Shore exposures, although it was upheld by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Industrial Union Department,
AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974), has been widely
criticized as unsafe and is due to be reduced by 60 percent in 1976. Id.
at 479. In fact, recent evidence has even cast doubt upon the validity
of the study that was relied upon in adopting the 1976 standard. United
States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 44-45 (D. Minn. 1974).
Furthermore, as the district court pointed out, asbestos workers are
exposed only during working hours, whereas the residents of Silver
Bay are exposed 24 hours a day.
39. Testimony at trial indicated, and both the district and the appel-
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district court, on the other hand, had found the lack of a known
threshold level to be a cause for alarm rather than a missing
element of plaintiff's proof, and held that its absence rendered
a precise quantification of the air counts unnecessary. 40 Instead,
that court found the broad ranges of fiber counts taken by wit-
nesses for both sides and by experts appointed by the court to
be generally comparable to levels found in the "environmental"
setting of asbestos workers' homes.4 1
As for the hazard allegedly created by ingestion of fibers,
the appellate court relied primarily on the results of a study
that had examined tissues from the bodies of deceased, long-time
Duluth residents for the presence of asbestiform fibers. The
court took the failure of the study to show significant fiber con-
centrations as indicating that the ingestion of fibers could not pose
a health threat.42 The district court, on the other hand, had re-
jected that tissue study as methodologically unsound,43 and had
late courts acknowledged, that counts subject to a nine-fold or greater
margin of error could not be used quantitatively to give a figure one
could rely on, but only qualitatively to indicate the presence of fibers.
Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1079 (8th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 47-50 (D. Minn.
1974). Both courts, however, found certain counts quantifiable because
of methodological safeguards. Thus the court of appeals explained in
its final opinion that Dr. Taylor's air counts, see note 38 supra and ac-
companying text, were subject to quantitative use because they em-
bodied the average of several readings. Reserve Mining Co. v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492, 511 n.34 (8th Cir. 1975). Curi-
ously, Dr. Taylor's counts were not likewise found to be quantifiable for
the purpose of establishing a lower than occupational level of exposure
with "some precision." That issue, however, was mooted by the court's
requirement of a known threshold level.
The district court had found some of the water counts quantifiable
on similar grounds, see note 47 infra and accompanying text, but this
finding was ignored by the appellate court.
40. 380 F. Supp. at 48.
41. Id. The district court did not make this finding as explicit as
it could have. It merely said the counts were comparable to those found
"to have been associated with disease in other environmental situations."
Id. The fact that the court was there referring to asbestos workers'
homes may be deduced from the plaintiffs' brief. Joint Brief in Opposi-
tion to Motion for Stay at 18, 22, Reserve Mining Co. v. United States,
498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1974).
42. 498 F.2d at 1078-81.
43. 380 F. Supp. at 50-51. The district court had concluded that the
tissue study deserved little weight because the amount of tissue studied
"could possibly cover the surface of the blunt end of a straight pin," be-
cause the parts of the body studied were "not areas in which fibers had
been found by other investigators," and because "this was the first at-
tempt to look for fibers in a population that had only environmental ex-
posure." Id. at 50.
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found that ingestion of fibers could cause disease. It had based
this finding on evidence that asbestos workers eventually in-
gested about one-half of the fibers they inhaled, that such fibers
could pass through the stomach lining, and that asbestos work-
ers contracted gastrointestinal cancer at a high rate.4 Indeed,
a government expert had testified that ingestion could "prob-
ably" cause disease.45  The appellate court rejected this finding
as based on "theoretical medical opinions" lacking "scientific or
medical certainty" and insufficient to overcome the "direct evi-
dence" of the tissue study.46 Thus the appellate court was able
to ignore the district court's further finding that the fibers were
present in dangerous quantities in the drinking water of North
Shore communities. 47
On the basis of this analysis of the evidence the appellate
court concluded that
the discharges by Reserve can be characterized only as pre-
senting an unquantifiable risk, i.e., a health risk which either
may be negligible or may be significant, but with any signifi-
cance as yet based on unknowns .... 48
and that
although Reserve's discharges represent a possible medical
danger, they have not in this case been proven to amount to a
health hazard. The discharges may or may not result in detri-
mental health effects, but, for the present, that is simply un-
known. 49
The question then becomes, the court continued, "what man-
ner of judicial cognizance may be taken of the unknown."50
"None," was the import of its answer. The district court's deci-
sion to go "beyond the evidence" and resolve "all uncertainties...
in favor of health safety" represented "a legislative policy judg-
ment, not a judicial one."5' To support this proposition, the
44. Id. at 51-52.
45. Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514
F.2d 492, 516 n.47 (8th Cir. 1975).
46. Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1082 (8th
Cir. 1974).
47. In assessing the amount of fibers present in the drinking sup-
plies the district court had acknowledged that any given count of fibers
in air or water is subject to a ten-fold margin of error. 380 F. Supp. at
47-48. See note 39 supra and accompanying text. It found, however, that
because "some laboratories were fairly constant in arriving at [water
counts] consistent with the mean of all the laboratories," those counts
were quantitatively valid and showed dangerous levels of fibers. 380
F. Supp. 48.
48. 498 F.2d at 1082.
49. Id. at 1083.
50. Id. at 1084.
51. Id.
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court of appeals quoted the following passage from Industrial
Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson,5 2 a case which had up-
held the OSHA standards set by the Secretary of Labor for occu-
pational exposure to asbestos:
[S]ome of the questions involved in the promulgation of these
standards are on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, and con-
sequently as to them insufficient data is presently available to
make a fully informed factual determination. Decision making
must in that circumstance depend to a greater extent upon
policy judgments and less upon purely factual analysis.5 3
The implication was that policy judgments by an administrative
agency in this context are permissible, because its function is
quasi-legislative, but that those of a court are not. Thus, the
court stated:
[A]lthough we are sympathetic to the uncertainties facing the
residents of the North Shore, we are a court of law, governed by
rules of proof, and unknowns may not be substituted for proof of
a demonstrable hazard to the public health. 54
It is interesting to note that the chief court-appointed wit-
ness, Dr. Arnold Brown-on whose testimony the court of ap-
peals had relied for its findings as to the unquantifiability of
the fiber counts and the significance of the tissue study5 5 -had
recommended that the plant be closed.56 Indeed, the district
court had relied on Dr. Brown's opinion in issuing the injunc-
tion.5 7 The appellate court rejected this recommendation as a
"medical concern," asserting that Dr. Brown was "essentially in
agreement that the discharges here simply have not been proven
to be a demonstrable hazard."5 8 This statement and the appel-
late court's acknowledgement that the discharges posed a "pos-
sible medical danger"5 9 imply that such medical concerns are to
be placed in the same category as "legislative policy judgments."
The above review should suggest that, although proof of a
health danger to North Shore residents was problematical, the
52. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
53. 498 F.2d at 1084, quoting Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v.
Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
54. 498 F.2d at 1084 (emphasis added).
55. Dr. Brown had acknowledged that the tissue study failed to
demonstrate fiber concentrations which were greater than normal. 498
F.2d at 1081. He had also indicated, however, that the study did not exon-
erate the tailings discharge as a possible cause of disease by ingestion
of fibers. Id.
56. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 51 (D.
Minn. 1974); Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1083
(8th Cir. 1974).
57. 380 F. Supp. at 51.
58. 498 F.2d at 1083.
59. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
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rather wooden approach of the appellate court exhibited a lack
of sensitivity to the plight of those residents, despite that court's
protestation to the contrary. The degree to which the approach
employed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in its
final opinion departs from that taken in its stay opinion is re-
markable. An explicit application of the risk-benefit concept of
proof recently espoused by environmentalist commentators and
congressmen 60 replaced the rigid "rules of proof" and permitted
the court, in effect, to make a "legislative policy judgment" to
close the plant in order to implement the "reasonable medical
concern" aroused by the evidence.61
B. THE FiNAL OPmION
Stating at the outset of its final opinion that the question
before it was whether the evidence demonstrated any "legally
cognizable" risk to public health,62 the court noted that
many of the issues in the case do not involve "historical" facts
subject to the ordinary means of judicial resolution. Indeed, a
number of the disputes involve conflicting theories and experi-
mental results, about which it would be judicially presumptuous
to offer conclusive findings.63
It went on to quote the following statement from the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia:
Where ... the [EPA] regulations turn on choices of policy, on
an assessment of risks, or on predictions dealing with matters on
the frontiers of scientific knowledge, we will demand adequate
reasons and explanations, but not "findings" of the sort familiar
from the world of adjudication.64
The passage is virtually identical to the one that the court had
quoted in its stay opinion when admonishing the district court
for its "legislative policy judgment" to resolve "all uncertainties
... in favor of health safety. ' 65 Like the earlier quotation, it is
60. See notes 11-24 supra and accompanying text.
61. 514 F.2d at 520. The Court of Appeals made no attempt to
define precisely what "rules of proof" it did apply in the earlier decision.
One can probably infer that the court applied the ordinary '"more prob-
able than not" standard, requiring that it must appear more likely than
not that harm will result from the discharges. This is suggested by the
court's insistence that an excessive rate of disease due to the discharge
must be shown to be predictable, 498 F.2d at 1084, as well as by its re-
quirement that plaintiffs show exposure comparable to occupational
levels or exposures in excess of a known threshold level.
62. 514 F.2d at 507.
63. Id. at 507 n.20 (emphasis added).
64. Id., quoting Amoco Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency,
501 F.2d 722, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
65. 498 F.2d at 1084. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
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drawn from a case involving judicial review of administrative
agency decisionmaking. Thus, the court of appeals acknowledged
that where the issues involved are on "the frontiers of scientific
knowledge," judges need not bow out of the court room with
an embarrassed expression of sympathy for the uncertainties
faced by potential victims of pollution 66 and an explanation that
courts are governed by immutable "rules of proof." They
may, like administrative agencies, make the necessary "policy"
judgments.
The appellate court's reconsideration of the evidence in the
Reserve case is an admirable implementation of this view. 67
Turning first to the plant's discharges into the air, and examin-
ing the studies that have demonstrated the fatal effects of inhal-
ing asbestos fibers, the court emphasized that exposures less se-
vere than occupational levels have been implicated as the cause
of death, especially by mesothelioma,68 and that "[i] t is signifi-
cant that the witnesses generally agreed that no known safe Zevel
of exposure exists for mesothelioma."' 6 9 This approach differs
significantly from the court's prior omission of any reference to
the proven dangers of "enviromnental" exposures and its re-
quirement that plaintiffs carry the burden of showing a known
threshold level.70
As for the question of what concentrations of fibers were
present in the air of Silver Bay, the court again relied exclusively
on the court-appointed witness. Instead of comparing his
counts to the OSHA standard for occupational exposure, as it
had in the stay opinion,71 the court of appeals this time noted
that although the measurements could not be accepted as precise,
they appeared to exceed by a statistically significant margin the
levels found in St. Paul, the control city.72
66. Cf. text accompanying note 54 supra.
67. Although the appellate court was reviewing the decision of a
lower court, and thus acknowledged that the "clearly erroneous" stand-
ard of review applied, 514 F.2d at 507 n.20, it admitted that its review of
the evidence under the risk-benefit approach was tantamount to a trial
court's initial application of that standard of proof to the facts. Id. at
507 n.20.
68. Id. at 508.
69. Id. n.25 (emphasis added). The phrase "no known safe level"
was apparently borrowed from the district court. 380 F. Supp. at 47.
70. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
71. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
72. 514 F.2d at 511.
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The court's approach to the tailings discharge was similar.
On the question whether ingestion could cause disease, the court
again cited the negative results of the Duluth tissue study as evi-
dence that it could not. But instead of treating this study as
conclusive, as it had previously,73 the court went on to review
the evidence in support of the lower court's conclusion that inges-
tion was dangerous. It found the animal studies designed to de-
termine whether asbestos fibers could pass through the gastro-
intestinal wall "conflicting" but of "some support" for the propo-
sition that ingestion could cause disease; 4 and it found the
theory that the excessive rate of gastrointestinal cancer among
asbestos workers is due to ingestion of fibers originally inhaled
to be "a tenable medical hypothesis. '75 It even quoted the testi-
mony of a government witness that ingestion was the "probable"
cause of this excessive rate of disease.7 6 These were the pieces
of evidence that it had previously rejected as "theoretical medical
opinions" insufficient to overcome the "direct evidence" of the
tissue study.7 7 On the issue of the level of exposure through
ingestion, the court examined the evidence supporting the dis-
trict court's finding 8 that Duluth residents ingest quantities
of fibers comparable to those found to cause gastrointestinal can-
cer among workers,7 9 and found it to be "weak" but worthy of
consideration."0
In preparing to draw its conclusions, the court reiterated that
the questions involved lay "on the frontiers of scientific knowl-
edge." ' The court's task in such a situation, like that of an ad-
ministrative agency, was to consider both the "probabilities" and
the "consequences" of the alleged harm.8 2  Where the conse-
quences are "dire," the probability need not be high in order
to justify precautionary relief.88 Thus,
[iln assessing probabilities in this case, it cannot be said that the
probability of harm is more likely than not. Moreover, the level
of probability does not readily convert into a prediction of conse-
73. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
74. 514 F.2d at 515-16.
75. Id. at 516.
76. Id.
77. Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1082 (8th
Cir. 1974). See text accompanying note 46 supra.
78. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 48 (D.
Minn. 1974). See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
79. 514 F.2d at 516-17.
80. Id. at 517.
81. Id. at 519.
82. Id. at 519-20.
83. Id. at 520.
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qucnces. On this record it cannot be forecast that the rates of
cancer will increase from drinking Lake Superior water or
breathing Silver Bay air. The best that can be said is that the
existence of this asbestos contaminant in air and water gives rise
to a reasonable medical concern for the public health. The pub-
lic's exposure to asbestos fibers in air and water creates some
health risk. Such a contaminant should be removed.8 4
The "medical concerns" which the court had rejected in its stay
opinion thus became the ultimate basis of relief.
This calculation of probabilities and consequences, however,
was not sufficient, in the court's view, to determine the proper
timing of relief. That question was resolved by a balancing of
the hazards or risks thus determined against the benefits of al-
lowing the discharges to continue.8 5 The court of appeals ob-
served that the trial court had "considered many appropriate fac-
tors" in deciding to grant an immediate injunction,
such as a) the nature of the anticipated harm, b) the burden on
Reserve and its employees from the issuance of the injunction,
c) the financial ability of Reserve to convert to other methods of
waste disposal, and d) a margin of safety for the public.8 6
Careful enough attention, however, had not been given to the
"probabilities of harm."87 In the opinion of the appellate court,
the probability of harm in the present case was not great enough
to justify an immediate injunction when balanced against the
severe economic problems to be expected from a shutdown of
the plant:
A court is not powerless to act in these circumstances. But an
immediate injunction cannot be justified in striking a balance
between unpredictable health effects and the clearly predictable
social and economic consequences that would follow the plant
closing.88
As to just 'how long relief should be postponed, the court
distinguished between the air and water discharges:
84. Id. In support of its determination that "such a contami-
nant should be removed," the court quoted a lengthy passage from the
testimony of Dr. Brown to the effect that, although he could not scientif-
ically predict that an excessive rate of disease would occur as a result
of the discharge, he as a medical man would urge that it be stopped.
Id. at 518-19. Ironically, this was the same testimony that the district
court had quoted in support of its decision to enjoin the discharges.
380 F. Supp. at 51.
85. 514 F.2d at 535.
86. Id. at 536.
87. Id. The court borrowed all five of these factors from Note, Im-
minent Irteparable Injury: A Need for Reform, 45 S. CALi. L, Rsv. 1025
(1972). See note 22 supra.
88. 514 F.2d at 536.
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With respect to the water, these probabilities must be deemed
low for they do not rest on a history of past health harm at-
tributable to ingestion but on a medical theory implicating ...
ingestion... as a causative factor. . . . With respect to air, the
assessment of the risk of harm rests on a higher degree of proof,
a correlation between inhalation of asbestos dust and subsequent
illness.89
Reserve therefore must "promptly take all steps necessary" to
reduce its air emissions so that the fiber count in Silver Bay
does not exceed that of a control city such as St. Paul;90 but
has at least two years and perhaps several more, to end its
water discharges.9 1
The court of appeals attempted to justify the radical differ-
ence between the standards of proof applied in its two opinions
on the ground that it was reviewing the propriety of an im-
mediate injunction in the former opinion and of delayed relief
in the latter.92  This explanation will not withstand scrutiny,
however. In the first place, such a distinction is theoretically
untenable. The "rules of proof" applicable to a case do not alter
as the immediacy of the relief sought changes. If "judicial cogni-
zance" may be taken of slight -and imperfectly proved risks in
granting delayed relief, consideration of such risks must be
equally appropriate where immediate relief is at issue. The dif-
ference between the two situations is one of relief, not proof of
harm; or, in terms of the risk-benefit analysis that the court
adopted, one of benefit, not of risk.93
In the second place, such a distinction is belied by the lan-
guage of the stay opinion. It contains no indication that the
court was considering only the propriety of immediate injunc-
tive relief. The court spoke of "the health issue" without quali-
fication. At the outset it said:
89. Id.
90. Id. at 538-39. See note 7 supra.
91. Id. at 538. See note 7 supra.
92. The later opinion explained the earlier as follows:
[W]e forecast that Reserve would likely prevail on the merits
of the health issue. We limited this forecast to the single issue
before us whether Reserve's plant should be closed immediately
because of a "substantial danger" rthe district court's finding]
to health.... We reached no preliminary decision on whether
the facts justified a less stringent abatement order.
[W]e adhere to our preliminary assessment that the evidence is
insufficient to support the kind of demonstrable danger to the
public health that would justify the immediate closing of Re-
serve's operations. We now address the basic question of
whether the discharges pose any risk to public health and, if so,
whether the risk is one which is legally cognizable.
Id. at 506-07.
93. See text accompanying note 104 infra.
[Vol. 59:893
RESERVE MINING
[W]e conclude that Reserve appears likely to succeed on the
merits of its appeal on the health issue. We proceed now to
trace the outlines of the testimony supporting this view.9 4
The court also spoke in absolute terms when it indicated that
"judicial cognizance" could not be taken of the unknown, and
that the district court had made an impermissible "legislative
policy judgment."99  A statement made by one of the judges at
a hearing held some months after the stay opinion supports this
reading:
You [counsel for the United States] don't seem to accept the
fact that the Court pretty carefully considered that health issue
once and made a preliminary determination for the purpose of
the stay; that neither an immediate nor a long-range health
hazard had been proven.96
It must be concluded, therefore, that the decision of the ap-
pellate court to apply risk-benefit principles in its final decision
represents a tacit reversal of its earlier rejection of such an ap-
proach. If the court again faces the issue, it should recognize
this reversal explicitly and determine the propriety of either
immediate or delayed relief on common risk-benefit grounds.
Any decision to delay relief could then be based on the legiti-
mate ground that benefits outweighed risks only with regard to
immediate relief, rather than on an indefensible use of varying
standards of proof.
II. PROBABILITIES AND THE IMMEDIACY OF RELIEF
The application of the risk-benefit approach in the final opin-
ion of the court of appeals is, for the most part, a faithful adop-
tion of the proposals of environmentalist commentators and cur-
rent congressional bills.9 7 There remains an incongruity between
the facts of the Reserve case and the relief granted by the court,
however, which suggests that either the proposals or the court's
application of them is faulty. The theory behind the postpone-
ment of the relief granted in the final opinion was that the evi-
dence before the court was not sufficiently probative to allow a
prediction that harm would occur; rather, the evidence merely
94. Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1078 (8th
Cir. 1974).
95. See text accompanying notes 50-54 supra.
96. Joint Application for an Order Vacating the Indefinite Stay
Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit at
28-29, Minnesota v. Reserve Mining Co., 95 S. Ct. 287 (1974) (emphasis
added), quoting transcript of hearing of Aug. 9, 1974, at 56, Reserve Min-
ing Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
97. See notes 14, 19-22 supra and accompanying text.
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reflected a "reasonable medical theory" or "hypothesis."08 Em-
ploying the risk-benefit formula of balancing probabilities and
consequences against benefits, the court treated this lack of pro-
bative weight as equivalent to a low probability of harm. 9 Such
a low probability could not justify an immediate injunction, it
concluded, where there was some benefit in allowing the allegedly
harmful activity to continue.
The court's reasoning on this point was incorrect in two re-
spects: first, the concept of probability, as the term is normally
understood, has no relation to the probative weight of the evi-
dence presented in the Reserve case; and second, the relative suf-
ficiency of the evidence should not have controlled the timing
of relief. In order to explain these flaws in the court's logic,
it is necessary to distinguish two types of statements as to the
probability that an event will occur-objective and subjective.
A statement of objective or statistical probability actually
describes the likelihood that an event will occur and results from
the action of random or apparently random factors. For in-
stance, the weather and some genetic events occur randomly;10 0
other events appear to occur randomly because, though they
may be due to constant factors, those factors are so complex that
human beings cannot discern their operation.1 10 In both in-
stances a probability statement such as "if X occurs then there
is a 57 percent chance that Y will occur" has an objective mean-
ing upon which human beings can reasonably plan a course of
action. To illustrate, suppose a group of people are each given
the chance to play a game of Russian roulette in which each
must announce at the outset how many times he will pull the
trigger of a six-chambered revolver aimed at his head and con-
taining one bullet; for each round safely completed, the player
will receive $1,000,000.102 In deciding how many rounds to play,
98. Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514
F.2d 492, 536 (8th Cir. 1975).
99. Id. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
100. Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environ-
mental Decisionmaking, 48 S. CA.iF. L. Rsv. 371, 411 (1974).
101. Id.
102. Since the player will not be allowed to spin the cylinder be-
tween rounds, the objective probability of losing each round considered
separately will be the number of times the trigger will be pulled in that
round (one) divided by the number of unfired chambers remaining.
Thus, the probability of losing the first round will be one in six, the
second one in five, etc. At the outset, however, the player can calculate
his overall chance of losing by dividing the total number of times he
will commit himself to pull the trigger by the total number of chambers
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each must balance the steadily increasing probability of losing
against the value to him of the incremental $1,000,000 which he
will receive for each additional successful attempt. Some may
wish to play one round, some more than one, and some none.
The answers will depend on the relative values each places on
life and money, considered in light of the objective probability
of losing. The point is that where the probability of a harmful
event's occurrence may indeed be estimated objectively, one may
sensibly base a decision as to whether and for how long to risk
its occurrence upon that estimate, in light of other relevant fac-
tors.
Subjective statements of probability, on the other hand, do
not really refer to probabilities at all. Rather, they state a de-
gree of human certainty about the occurrence of an event which,
although it is already objectively certain to take place or not
and depends neither on random nor on apparently random fac-
tors, cannot be foreknown because of the imperfection of human
knowledge. It is this type of probability statement that is gen-
erally inherent in the determination of a court or jury that a
standard of proof has been met. It will state, for instance, that
the occurrence of an event is "more probable than not"; but by
"probable" it refers to a subjective state of certainty. When the
trier of fact becomes sufficiently certain he determines, in effect,
that for legal purposes the event has occurred or will occur.
Thus, it does not matter whether he is actually more certain than
the law requires him to be-for example, 95 percent instead of
51 percent. Judicial relief is equally justified in either case.10 3
The probabilities upon which the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit based its decision to postpone relief were purely
subjective. It agreed with the determination of the district court
that lethal asbestiform fibers continually reach the air and water
supplies of North Shore communities in significant quantities.
The court was only uncertain as to whether the fibers were suf-
ficiently plentiful to cause disease and whether ingestion could
cause disease, and these doubts were based solely upon imperfect
human information. As far as nature is concerned, it is perfectly
certain either that the fibers discharged by Reserve are sufficient
to kill, and are in the process of killing, North Shore residents,
or that they are not. Thus, once the court of appeals had de-
(six). A player who announces that he will participate in two rounds
will therefore have an objective probability of two in six of losing.
103. The use of percentages in this context is really quite inappropri-
ate, but serves to suggest degrees of conviction.
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termined that the proof was sufficient to justify relief on the
assumption that the first of these alternatives was true, the de-
gree of that proof should have had no bearing on the immediacy
of relief. In deciding that the benefits of allowing the plant to
continue operating were outweighed by the gravity of the harm
in light of the subjective certainty of its occurrence, and thus that
the discharges should cease, the court had determined that the al-
leged harm should be treated as a fact, and the relative degree
of certainty therefore became irrelevant. Under these circum-
stances the postponement of relief simply aggravates the harm
by subjecting North Shore residents to new or continued ex-
posures.
This is not to say that a decison to postpone relief could
not have been validly based upon a calculation that the benefits
of allowing the discharges to continue for a limited period out-
weighed the risks of additional harm created by such a continued
exposure, while in the long run the risks of such a continued
exposure would outweigh the benefits. Such a determination
could have been based upon a prediction that the detrimental
economic impact of an immediate injunction would be more se-
vere than that of a shutdown following a transition period. But
where the lives of thousands are at stake, it is unlikely that a
court would find those lives outweighed by the increase in eco-
nomic benefits between immediate and postponed relief; and in-
deed, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit did not so find.
Rather it based the postponement of relief, including the differ-
ence in the timing of relief from the air and water discharges,
solely upon its analysis of the "probabilities" of harm.104
Thus, ironically, after having set out to render a final deci-
sion in the Reserve case under principles it had previously de-
scribed as forbidden by judicial "rules of proof,"'10 5 the court of
appeals based that decision upon a violation of another rule of
proof-namely, that a party who has proved facts sufficient to
merit an injunction is entitled to that remedy without delay, un-
less the balance of conveniences or some other equitable consider-
ation weighs in favor of the defendant. 156 The result is that
the potential victims of Reserve's discharges must wait as long
104. Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514
F.2d 492, 535-36 (8th Cir. 1975).
105. Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1084 (8th
Cir. 1974).
106. See 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE: CivIL § 2942, at 366 n.42, 367 n.43 (1973).
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as several more years for relief' 0 7 -unless in the meantime plain-
tiffs' "reasonable medical theory"1 08 proves to be true and North
Shore residents begin to die from exposure to asbestiform par-
ticles.
III. IMMINENT HAZARDS AND THE
IMMEDIACY OF RELIEF
The second misconception underlying the appellate court's
interpretation of the risk-benefit approach also concerns the tim-
ing of relief. Several times in its final opinion the court point-
edly contrasted the sort of "potential threat to the public health"
that it found in Reserve with an "imminent" hazard or danger
to the public health.109 Its purpose was to distinguish hazards
that justify immediate relief from those that permit relief to be
delayed. Only an imminent hazard would require immediate re-
lief, and Reserve's discharges did not present one.
The court apparently drew this imminent hazard or danger
concept from formulations of enjoinable pollution found in sev-
eral federal environmental and health statutes. Both the Clean
Air Act and the amended version of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA), for instance, employ the phrase "im-
minent and substantial endangerment" to define pollution
against which the Administrator may seek an immediate injunc-
tion rather than resort to the acts' ordinary, more dilatory en-
forcement procedures. 1 0 Inasmuch as neither of these pro-
visions has received authoritative judicial or administrative con-
struction, the court's assumption that the quoted language would
not allow relief in a situation like that involved in Reserve be-
comes important. Moreover, an appreciation of the sense in
which these statutes use the term "imminent" would perhaps
have led the court to grant immediate relief from the imminent
health threat which Reserve's discharges do indeed create.
The court's various references to imminent dangers and
hazards reveal a definition containing two elements. First, the
anticipated harm must be temporally immediate:
107. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
108. Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514
F.2d 492, 538 (8th Cir. 1975).
109. Id. at 500, 515, 528, 537.
110. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-1 (1970); FWPCA, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1364 (Supp. II 1972). The provisions are identical. Several other fed-
eral statutes also use the concept of an "imminent hazard" to the public
health to define activities subject to immediate restraint. These are dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 118-27 infra.
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No harm to the public health has been shown to have occurred
to this date and the danger to health is not imminent .... No
reason exists which requires that Reserve terminate its opera-
tions at once."'
The tissue study, showing no evidence of present disease, there-
fore indicated to the court "that no emergency -or imminent
hazard to health exists." 112
Second, imminent hazards involve greater risks of harm
than do situations involving danger that is not imminent:
The term "endangering," as used by Congress in § 1160(g) (1),
connotes a lesser risk of harm than the phrase "imminent and
substantial endangerment to the health of persons" as used by
Congress in the 1972 amendments to the FWPCA. 33 U.S.C. §
1364 (Supp. 1974). 113
By "risk" of harm, the court meant the "probability," or subjec-
tive certainty, that harm will occur. In other words, proof of
harm must meet a higher standard under the "imminent" test
than under the "endangering" provision applicable to Reserve's
water discharge." 4 Thus, presumably, the court would interpret
the "imminent and substantial endangerment" provision of the
present FWPCA and the Clean Air Act, and similar provisions
of other statutes,11 5 as requiring proof of a high risk of immedi-
ate harm, and would therefore hold those provisions inapplicable
to the "potential threat to the public health" involved in
Reserve.116
111. 514 F.2d at 500.
112. Id. at 515.
113. Id. at 528.
114. The identity of risk, probability, and proof of harm in the court's
vocabulary can be deduced from other portions of its opinion. For ex-
ample: "These concepts of potential harm, whether they be assessed as
'probabilities and consequences' or 'risk and harm' necessarily must
apply . . . [where] proof with certainty is impossible." Id. at 520.
115. See note 110 supra.
116. 514 F.2d at 500, 528. The court held that the then applicable
FWPCA provision authorizing a court to enjoin water pollution "endan-
gering" the public health, 33 U.S.C. § 1160(g) (1970) [which has now
been superseded by the "imminent and substantial endangerment" provi-
sion of the current FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (Supp. II 1972)], encom-
passed the risk-benefit approach, and particularly that it allowed a grant
of relief against "potential harm to the public health." 514 F.2d at 519-
20.
In support of this interpretation of the term "endangering," the court
cited the dissenting opinion of Judge Wright in Ethyl Corp. v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 7 E.R.C. 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1975), a case
involving the similar statutory phrase, "will endanger the public health."
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(c) (1) (A) (1970). Judge Wright read
"danger" as meaning "risk of harm," 7 E.R.C. at 1385-90, which terms
appear to be his equivalents, respectively, of the Reserve court's "proba-
bilities" and "consequences." 514 F.2d at 520. Ironically, the approach
to the standard of proof taken by the two-man majority in Ethyl is corn-
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Both aspects of the court's definition of the "imminent" dan-
ger concept are inappropriate in the context of the Reserve case,
and more generally do not represent a justifiable interpretation
of the FWPCA and Clean Air Act provisions. The first aspect-
that immediate relief is justified only by immediate harm-is re-
futed by logic; by the language of the Clean Air Act, the FWPCA,
and similar provisions in other statutes; and by official interpre-
tations of those latter statutes. Logically, it is senseless to tie
the immediacy of relief to the imminence of harm, because in
many cases harm occurring far in the future will be attributable
to present events. That is the situation in Reserve and in many
other cases involving the unknown effects of carcinogens pres-
ently being introduced into the environment. Only by enjoining
the present cause can the ultimate effect be prevented.
The various statutes themselves also support the interpreta-
tion that immediate relief is not dependent upon a showing of
immediate harm, since they refer to dangers or hazards that are
imminent, not to imminent harms.1 17 The imminently dangerous
situation is the present occurrence of events which, unless
stopped, will create harm either now or in the future.
Although the relevant language of neither the FWPCA nor
the Clean Air Act has been officially construed, the courts, agen-
cies, and Congress have consistently rejected the view of the Re-
serve court when called upon to interpret analogous provisions
of other statutes. For example, the three institutions have
cooperated in developing an interpretation of the provision in
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)
that allows the Secretary of Agriculture to suspend the regis-
parable to the rigid stance taken by the Reserve court in its stay opinion.
The Ethyl court stated, for instance, that
[fJor the dissent to argue that the Administrator can dispense
with proof of actual harm, i.e., what has occurred in the past,
and can nevertheless somehow determine potential harm, is to
grant the plainest license for the wildest speculation. We have
always thought scientific conclusions, above all, demanded proof
by events recorded and observed.
7 E.R.C. at 1357. The full Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has decided to rehear the case en banc, at which time adoption of Judge
Wright's approach seems both likely and deserved.
117. See note 110 supra and accompanying text. The Federal Insec-
ticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 135 et seq.
(1970), the Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261 et seq. (1970),
and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1970), all
contain provisions allowing substances that create "an imminent hazard"
to the public to be immediately restrained by the responsible agency.
7 U.S.C. § 136d (c) (1) (Supp. II 1972); 15 U.S.C. § 1261(q) (2) (1970); 21
U.S.C. §§ 355 (e) (4), 360b (e) (1) (1970).
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tration of a pesticide immediately if he determines that such ac-
tion is necessary to prevent an "imminent hazard" to the public
health."' The first opportunity to interpret that phrase fell to
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,1" 9 which found
mention in the legislative history of FIFRA that its procedures
were generally modeled after similar "imminent hazard" pro-
visions in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.120 Thus, the court
determined that the legislative -history of the latter statute could
be used in the interpretation of the former. That history, the
court said,
reflected that an imminent hazard to the public health would
exist when... a drug was so unsafe as to create a public health
situation "which must be corrected immediately."121
This definition avoids the pitfall of reading "imminent" with
reference to the harm itself, relating it instead to the hazardous
situation faced by potential victims of the harmful substance.
The next step in the interpretation of FIFRA was taken by
the Secretary of Agriculture. When the provision was again pre-
sented for judicial review, the reviewing court approved as con-
sistent with the statutory language and purpose the Secre-
tary's conclusion that
the most important element of an "imminent hazard to the pub-
lic" is a serious threat to public health, [and] that a hazard may
be "imminent" even if its impact will not be apparent for many
years .... 122
The final step in the process of interpreting this provision
was taken by Congress. Tacitly approving the judicial and ad-
ministrative developments, it amended the original statutory lan-
guage 28 by adding a provision that defines an imminent hazard
as a situation wherein continued use of a pesticide "would be
likely to result in unreasonable adverse effects on the environ-
ment .... 1 124 An "unreasonable adverse effect on the environ-
ment" is further defined as "any unreasonable risk to man or
118. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c) (1) (Supp. II 1972). See also note 117 supra.
The Administrator of the federal Environmental Protection Agency is
now charged with enforcement of the Act.
119. Nor-Am Agric. Prods., Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir.
1970).
120. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(e) (4), 360b(3) (1) (1970). See also note 117
supra.
121. 435 F.2d at 1142.
122. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584,
597 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).
123. 7 U.S.C. § 136d (c) (1) (Supp. II 1972).
124. Id. § 136(L).
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the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and
environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide."'1 25
Similar "imminent hazard" provisions contained in the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act and in the Hazardous Substances Act126
have received virtually identical administrative interpretation.
The single regulation promulgating that interpretation contains
the particularly illuminating statement that "[t] he 'imminent
hazard' may be declared at any point in the chain of events which
may ultimately result in harm to the public health.' 127
In light of these developments it seems unlikely-contrary
to the assumption made by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit-that Congress intended the "imminent and substantial
endangerment" provision of the FWPCA and Clean Air Act to
be interpreted as requiring imminent harm. 28 Verbally, it is
not significantly different from the "imminent hazard" formula
of FIFRA and the other statutes. Moreover, all of the "im-
minent" provisions previously discussed fulfill the same func-
tion: granting relief where the ordinary enforcement procedures
of the particular statutes would be too slow. A requirement
that immediate harm be shown would therefore frustrate both
the language and the intent of the statutes.
The second element contained within the appellate court's
definition of the "imminent" danger concept is the assertion that
the phrase "imminent and substantial endangerment" "connotes"
a higher degree of risk, or proof of harm, than does the "en-
dangering" the public health language of the former FWPCA. 29
This contention likewise cannot withstand scrutiny. In the first
place, it is implausible as a matter of plain English: "imminent"
cannot support the requirement of a higher degree of proof, be-
cause it refers only to a temporal element-whether that be the
timing of the harm or of the hazard. Nor can "substantial,"
which merely embodies a cautionary instruction to the Adminis-
trator not to act on de minimis or imagined risks. That leaves
"endangerment," which corresponds to "endangering" in the old
FWPCA. Thus, a comparison of the present and former language
of the FWFCA on this point reveals no reason to believe that
Congress, in changing that statute, meant to change the degree
of risk required for immediate relief.
125. Id. § 136(bb).
126. See note 117 supra.
127. 21 C.F.R. § 3.73 (1974).
128. See note 110 supra. The legislative history of both acts is silent
as to the meaning of the phrase.
129. 33 U.S.C. § 1160(g) (1970).
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Nor can support for the view of the appellate court in
Reserve be found in precedent. Official interpretations of the
various "imminent hazard" provisions'3 0 have found them to re-
quire that the decisionmaker apply the same principles of risk-
benefit analysis that were ultimately found appropriate in Re-
serve under the "endangering" provision; those interpretations
have not suggested that any higher degree of proof is required
by the addition of "imminent." In this regard, the history of
the FIFRA provision again serves as an example. In Environ-
mental Defense Fund. v. Ruckelshaus,'1 3 1 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia noted, upon remanding the case to
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency for an
explanation of his refusal to suspend DDT immediately as an
imminent hazard, that a court must consider "both the magni-
tude of the anticipated harm, and the likelihood that it will oc-
cur.' 1 32 The implication was that the requisite degree of likeli-
hood that an imminent hazard will occur is not fixed at a particu-
lar level, but will vary with the magnitude of the harm. Con-
gress, in its subsequent statutory definition of the "imminent
hazard" phrase,133 sanctioned and elaborated upon this approach.
Its definition explicitly sets forth the principles of risk-benefit
analysis..3 4
This recognition that risk-benefit principles are appropriate
under a provision requiring that the hazard or danger be "im-
minent"' 35 refutes the assumpton of the Reserve court that such
a provision nonetheless requires a greater degree of risk than
does simple "endangering." The essence of the risk-benefit bal-
ancing process is that its standard of proof is flexible, varying
130. See notes 117-27 supra and accompanying text.
131. 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
132. Id. at 595.
133. See text accompanying notes 123-25 supra.
134. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136(l), (bb) (Supp. II 1972). The term "risk" as
ued in this statutory definition is the equivalent of the terms "probabili-
ties" and "consequences" as used by the Reserve court as well as of the
"likelihood" and ' magnitude" of harm referred to in Ruckelshaus.
135. The aforementioned administrative interpretation of the "immi-
nent hazard" provisions of the Hazardous Substances Act and the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetics Act, see note 127 supra, also envisions a risk-bene-
fit approach:
In exercising his judgment on whether an "imminent haz-
ard" exists, the Commissioner will consider the number of in-juries anticipated and the nature, severity, and duration of the
anticipated injury.
21 C.F.R. § 3.73 (b) (1974). The flexible likelihood or certainty standard
is encompassed by the definition of an "imminent hazard" as a "signif-
icant threat" that must be "corrected immediately to prevent injury."
Id.
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according to the weight of the other factors in the equation. The
issue under all the statutory provisions that have been discussed
is simply whether permitting the challenged activity to continue
is "reasonable" upon a consideration of all the factors. The only
distinction added by the word "imminent" is that the need for
relief from the activity must be immediate. On the other hand,
the use of the term "endangering," without more, encompasses
both such a situation and one where an analysis of benefits ren-
ders only a deferred remedy appropriate.
The interpretation of the imminence concept advanced in
Reserve, then, reflects both a misunderstanding of the statutes
in which it is used and a failure to appreciate the significance
of the public health danger in that case. Even assuming
the tissue study demonstrates that asbestiform fibers have not
yet accumulated in significant quantities in the tissues of Duluth
residents, and even assuming it cannot be "predicted" that the
residents of Silver Bay will soon begin to die, the hazards in-
volved are imminent, and delay will only aggravate whatever
harm may occur.
IV. A STATUTORY FORMULATION OF
RISK-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The stay opinion of the appellate court in Reserve 30 has
achieved the distinction of prompting introduction of federal
legislation to overrule the standard of proof applied in that deci-
sion. A bill initiated by Senators Hart of Michigan and Nelson
of Wisconsin shortly after the stay opinion would, in essence,
make the risk-benefit approach applicable to all suits' 3" brought
for the purpose of enjoining health threats pursuant to any stat-
ute administered by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) .13 Although the bill couches its proposal in procedural
136. Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir.
1974).
137. The bill exempts suits for review of federal administrative ac-
tions. S. 841, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1975).
138. Id. The proposal was originally introduced in August 1974. S.
1104, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 401-05, Amend. 1814 (1974).
That the bill was indeed inspired by the stay opinion in the Reserve
case was made clear by its authors. Hearing on S. 1104 Amend. 1814
Before the Subcomm. on the Environment of the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 126, at 1 (1974). The bill responded,
they said, to the statement of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
that the district court's decision to resolve "all uncertainties ... in favor
of health safety" was a "legislative policy judgment, not a judicial one."
120 CONG. REc. S. 15185 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1974), quoting Reserve Mining
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language-purporting to shift the burden of proof to the defend-
ant once the plaintiff has raised a rebuttable presumption of an
enjoinable health threat by introducing evidence that demon-
strates a "reasonable risk" of a health189 threat-its effect is sub-
stantive.140 It would ensure that the degree of certainty with
which harm must be shown in order to enjoin a health threat
is flexible rather than fixed, varying with the gravity of the al-
leged harm and with the benefits of the defendant's activity.
The device of a rebuttable presumption that shifts the burden
of proof is merely a statement of what ordinarily occurs once
a plaintiff has proved his case sufficiently to allow a directed
verdict on his behalf; the defendant then bears the burden of
rebutting the plaintiff's proof or succeeding on an affirmative
defense.
The authors of the bill have expressed uncertainty as to
whether it would change existing law. In introducing the pro-
posal to the Subcommittee on Environment of the Senate Com-
merce Committee, Senator Hart stated:
In rejecting the policy of the eighth circuit's panel, and in
proposing a new law to deal with the situation, I intend to take
Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1084 (8th Cir. 1974).
As the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. II 1972), and the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (1970), are both administered by the
EPA, the provisions in those statutes that allow the Administrator to seek
an immediate injunction against pollution creating an "imminent and
substantial endangerment" to the public health, 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (Supp.
II 1972), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-1 (1970), would fall within the bill's language.
The language of those existing statutes should be interpreted to require
the approach set forth by the bill. See text accompanying notes 128-
35 supra.
Senators Hart and Nelson have also introduced another bill on the
same topic. Simpler than, but similar in purpose to S. 841, it provides
that in any action brought under any statute administered by the EPA,
where a risk to public health is alleged and established, the fail-
ure by the party requesting such relief to prove that demon-
strable harm to health now exists or wfll result, shall not, in
and of itself, constitute a permissible basis to deny such relief.
S. 776, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Amend. 21 (1975). The phrase "demon-
strable harm to the public health" reflects the "demonstrable health
hazard" requirement of the stay opinion, see note 33 supra, which the
authors took to mean that actual harm must be proved. Hearing on S.
1104 Amend. 1814 Before the Subcomm. on the Environment of the Sen-
ate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 126, at 1 (1974). There
should be no need for this measure after the final opinion of the court
of appeals in Reserve, but caution perhaps justifies its passage.
139. S. 841, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1975).
140. Defendant can rebut the presumption by proving "that in fact
no public health threat exists or that the risk of any such threat is neg-
ligible," id. § 4(A), or that the "physical and economic" benefits of his
activity outweigh "all" of its costs, "including any possible threat to the
public health," id. § 4 (B).
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no position on whether the Reserve decision is authorized by
existing law.
It is my feeling that if that decision is consistent with the
law, as it now exists, the law should be changed as promptly as
possible. If on the other hand, the decision constitutes a misin-
terpretation of existing law, I would recommend that the law be
clarified so that such misinterpretations will not continue.141
Inasmuch as the bill covers only suits brought for injunctive re-
lief pursuant to statutes administered by the EPA, and since Re-
serve is the first health threat case to be brought under one of
those statutes, the question whether it changes existing law is
somewhat hypothetical. Moreover, with the Reserve court's re-
cent rejection of the approach taken in the stay opinion against
which the bill is directed, it now seems clear that existing law-
the final Reserve opinion-does encompass the bill's approach to
proof of a health hazard. Thus the final decision of the appellate
court in Reserve stands as a precedent for the very proposition
that Senators Hart and Nelson desire to write into law, and so
vitiates the urgency of their proposal.
Nonetheless, the desirability of the Hart-Nelson bill is quite
clear. Incorporating as it does a precautionary approach to cases
like Reserve, it can do no harm, and may inspire a court not
otherwise so inclined to reach the result required by an appro-
priate concern for human lives. That the measure would not
necessarily ensure such a result, however, is illustrated, ironic-
ally, by the final Reserve opinion. Perhaps prompted by the
bill, perhaps by a thorough review of the voluminous evidence,
the court applied the bill's principles to find a health threat;
but, having done so, it granted a remedy only slightly more satis-
factory than the relief it had granted in the stay decision after
denying the existence of a health threat and instead finding an
ultimate injunction warranted on the pollution issues.142  It is
hoped that a repetition of the court's mistaken denial of immedi-
ate relief will be precluded by recognition of the misconceptions
on which it was based. 43 Other courts, however, might have
reached the same decision to delay relief by finding that the eco-
nomic benefits of continued operation temporarily outweighed
141. Hearings on S. 1104 Amend. 1814 Before the Subcomm. on the
Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
ser. 126, at 2 (1974).
142. See text accompanying note 10 infra. On the other hand, the
risk-benefit approach was at least responsible for the change in the
court's position on the health issue, and would therefore have had a
greater impact in the absence of the pollution issues.
143. See text accompanying notes 97-135 supra.
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the need for relief. In certain cases such a result could be ap-
propriate, but where the public health is at stake those cases
should be rare. 44 Cases where the economic benefits of releas-
ing substances deleterious to human health into the environment
outweigh any relief should be even rarer.
The question remains, then, whether any statutory formula-
tion could ensure the result that a "reasonable medical concern"
should dictate in Reserve and similar cases. One solution would
be legislation identical to that proposed but without provision
for rebutting the presumption. This suggestion has been rejected
even by leading proponents of the risk-benefit approach, how-
ever, as "an irrational curtailment of resource use."'1 45 Assuming
society shares that view, any feasible solution must allow the
court to balance risks and benefits; this, given the difficulty of
measuring and comparing those factors, would necessarily
give the court a certain amount of discretion in the result.140
The ultimate solution, then, must lie with the judges. When they
are prepared to translate their sympathies for the "uncertain-
ties"' 47 faced by potential human victims of pollution into effec-
tive relief, the proper result will be reached with or without a
statute.
144. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
145. Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 100, at 416.
146. All of the previously discussed proposals advanced by environ-
mentalist commentators, see note 22 supra, grant the court such discre-
tion.
147. Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1084 (8th
Cir. 1974).
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